ECON 3090-002/FINN 3000-002  
Economic Policy and Financial Crises  
UNC Charlotte, Department of Economics, Spring 2015

1. Contact Information

Instructor: Fred R. Becker, Jr.  
Office: 218C Belk  
Office Hours: W & Fri: 10:00 AM - 12:00 AM & 1:45 PM - 2:45 PM  
Email: Fbecker1@uncc.edu  
Telephone: (704) 687-7031  
(Note: This telephone number is shared with other adjunct professors, as a result I may not receive your message. Accordingly, e-mail is the preferred method of communication.)

2. Important Dates & Times

Class Meetings:  
Wednesday and Friday, 12:30 PM - 1:45 PM  
Belk College of Business, Friday Building, Room 122

Deliverables:

Homework:

Assignment One: Handed into me by the start of Class 6, on Friday, January 23

Assignment Two: Handed into me by the start of Class 12, on Friday, February 13

Briefing Paper: Handed into me by the start of Class 17, on Wednesday, March 11

Class Presentations: Handed into me by the start of Class 23, on Wednesday, April 1

Groups 1 - 3: Class 25, on Friday, April 10  
Groups 4 - 6: Class 26, on Tuesday, April 15  
Groups 7 - 9: Class 27, on Friday, April 17

Final Exam: Wednesday, May 6, 2015, 11:00AM - 1:30 PM

3. General Information

Course Description: ECON 3090/FINN 3000. Financial crises have unfortunately been regular occurrences of market economies throughout world history, including bubbles, bank failures, and liquidity crises. This class will examine multiple crises and the governmental policy responses to them, ranging from Tulipmania, to the South Sea Bubble, to the Great Depression, to the S&L crisis, to the 1987 stock market crash, to Dot.com bubble, to the
Great Recession, with a focus on the actions the federal government has taken to prevent another financial crisis (Dodd-Frank). We will examine topics including securitization, credit regulation, banking regulation, and the role of financial market actors such as hedge funds. Prerequisites: ECON 2101 and ECON 2102.

Course Objectives: Conversant in using the financial terms and concepts discussed, understand the major theories purporting to explain financial crises, evaluate governmental responses from a legislative and regulatory policy perspective.

Your responsibilities:

1) Come to class, having read and considered the assigned material and questions (listed below).
2) Actively participate in inter-active class discussions.
3) Hand in assigned homework.
4) Write an 8 - 10 page "briefing" paper with a one-page executive summary on a specific assigned national financial policy subject area that arguably was a factor in the creation of the "perfect storm" that lead to the Great Recession and any legislative and/or regulatory actions subsequently taken in, or as a result of, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.4173). Further details on the paper are set forth below.
5) Prepare and present to the class as part of an assigned team an oral 15-20 minute PowerPoint presentation with other students who have been assigned the same subject issue paper. Further details on the team presentation are set forth below.
6) Take the final exam

NOTE: Homework assignments and the briefing paper should be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size 12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references must follow APA format. Include a cover page containing the title of the assignment, your name, my name, the course title, and the date. The cover page, one-page executive summary and the reference page(s) are not included in any required assignment page length. Homework assignments and the briefing paper are to be solely your own work product, without assistance of other classmates/friends, etc.

All written assignments are to be submitted in person to me and are due at the beginning of class - before I begin the day's discussion - any assignment submitted to me by any other means will not be considered for any credit!
Grading:

Class participation: 10%
Homework 10%
Written paper 30%
Team Presentation: 20%
Final Exam: 30%

Each assignment is graded on a curve with numerical distributions, approximately as follows:

Percent of Students Grade

- Top 35% A
- Next 40% B
- Next 20% C
- Next 2.5% D
- Lowest 2.5% F

A curve of this nature ensures that the best students (in the highest percentiles) will receive an A. That said, I have no difficulty giving all "A's" on any assignment, if all are exemplary. I will hand back each written assignment to you with a numerical grade and provide the class the distribution of the grades to each assignment to the class. In addition, I will send to each group an e-mail with their grade on the group presentation.

Paper

Imagine you are a staff member of a newly elected Senator who has just been appointed to the Senate Banking Committee. The Senator is an independent self-made small businessman from a moderate state where political ideology must be carefully balanced against the needs and interests of the state's populous. The Senator ran for office on the platform of compromise and doing what is truly best for his/her state and the nation and wants to do everything in his/her power to live up to that promise. He/she has been advised by the Chairman of the Banking Committee that a number of hearings are planned over the course of the year on Dodd-Frank and its implementation, if any to date, by the cognizant regulatory agency(s). The Chairman has also indicated that further changes in Dodd-Frank are possible (changes to Dodd-Frank were contained in the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Public Law No: 113-235 (December 16, 2014). He/she wants to be "up to speed and ready to go" when those hearings occur.

The Staff Director has assigned you write a paper on a specific assigned national financial policy subject area that arguably was a factor in the creation of the "perfect storm" that lead to the Great Recession and any legislative and/or regulatory actions subsequently taken in, or as a result of, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub.L.111-203, H.R. 4173, found at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.4173).
You should not discuss Dodd-Frank other than as it relates to the specific subject area you are assigned. The paper should include a background, discussion and recommendation section. The discussion section should present both sides of the issue, to include the advantages/disadvantages of the provision in Dodd-Frank and any changes that have been made in the law since Dodd-Frank's enactment. If regulations have not been issued, the Senator wants to know your recommendations as to what action should be taken. If the cognizant regulator(s) have taken action to implement the provision, the Senator wants to know what actions the regulator(s) have taken and your assessment of that action. The recommendations section of your paper should state whether the legislative provision and/or the regulatory action(s) taken should be modified (and if so how), or removed from law. Should you have any questions regarding this assignment, please do not hesitate to discuss it with me.

Team Assignment

Imagine that the Senator's staff director assigned more than one staff member to independently examine the same specific policy area. Now, having received and reviewed each staff member's paper, the Chief of Staff has asked you and your fellow staff members to share each other's work, meet, discuss and evaluate each other's views, and develop a presentation for the Senator, comparing and contrasting any differing views, making a recommendation where there is consensus, or otherwise calling for the Senator's decision.

To facilitate the team presentation, I will be placing you in a group with several of your fellow classmates who were assigned to write a paper on the same specific national policy subject area. To the extent possible I will be pairing those of you who consider yourself to be of the Chicago or Austrian school of economists (Friedman) with Keynesians. In addition, I will be paring finance majors with economic majors.

Class structure: This is not a lecture-format class. You need to come to class having read the assigned material and fully prepared to discuss it in response to the questions I pose during class. As economic and finance majors you are probably used to "numbers." This is, however, not a numbers course, it is a policy course. There will be little math. Given that this is a policy course, there will generally be no "right" answer - in fact I expect some disagreement among you in the class discussions and within the team groups. Furthermore, expect that I may choose to challenge your convictions.

Course Resources: The course does not require a textbook. I have included a listing of required readings for each class period below. For ease of reference I have attempted to provide you the URL where the document can be located wherever possible (if cutting and pasting the link in your web browser does not work, try to Google the title of the article). Also note that some readings are only available through the library.

Readings: The readings are probably longer in pages per class than many other economic or finance classes. Please note, however, that the readings and discussion questions in many instances cover two class periods. Also, somewhat mitigating is that many readings
(a) are physically small, relatively large type face sources that are double-spaced, (b) contain many graphs, (c) need not be read with the same intensity you would read a textbook, and (d) are logically written. Furthermore, in circumstances where you are familiar with certain concepts, such as “CDO” or “securitization,” you will be able to quickly review the material. Because academic research and literature on the Great Recession continues to actively evolve, I have not been able to find a single text that is authoritative and objective (over two decades passed before an authoritative text was written on the Great Depression). As much of the literature has a distinct point of view, multiple sources ensure more than one opinion is presented. Also note that for some reading that are particularly lengthy I have asked that you focus on certain portions of the assignment.

The entire syllabus has been provided at course inception in recognition of your personal schedule and to enable reading in advance. I am aware that many of you work. I reserve the right and privilege of changing and/or modifying the syllabus as we proceed through the semester and I welcome your comments and suggestions as to particular areas you would like to focus on.

General Rules

**Attendance:** Classroom attendance is mandatory. We will be covering a substantial amount of material and the easiest way to keep up will be to attend class and actively participate in the discussion. Be on time and stay for the duration. If you do not plan to attend the entire class period, please see me in advance or refrain from coming to class.

**Communication:** Communication with those outside of class while class is in progress is not acceptable. (In other words, turn off all communication devices prior to the start of class.) Check your UNC Charlotte e-mail (username@uncc.edu) for correspondence and updates.

**Academic Integrity:** Academic misconduct (cheating) will NOT be tolerated. In addition, you have the responsibility to know and observe the requirements of University Policy 40 (The Code of Student Academic Integrity). This code forbids cheating, fabrication or falsification of information, multiple submissions of academic work, plagiarism, abuse of academic materials, and complicity in academic dishonesty. Academic evaluations in this course include a judgment that your work is free from academic dishonesty of any type; and grades in this course therefore should be and will be adversely affected by academic dishonesty. Students who violate the code can be expelled from UNC Charlotte. The normal penalty for a first offense is zero credit on the work involving dishonesty and further substantial reduction of the course grade. In almost all cases, the course grade is reduced to U. Copies of the code can be obtained from the Dean of Students Office. Standards of academic integrity will be enforced in this course. You are expected to report cases of academic dishonesty to me.

**Statement on Diversity:** The Belk College of Business strives to create an inclusive academic climate in which the dignity of all individuals is respected and maintained. Therefore, we celebrate diversity that includes, but is not limited to ability/disability, age,
culture, ethnicity, gender, language, race, religion, sexual orientation, and socio-economic status.

**Disability Services.** UNCC is committed to access to education. If you have a disability and need academic accommodations, please provide a letter of accommodation from Disability Services early in the semester. For more information on accommodations, contact the Office of Disability Services at 704-687-0040 or visit their office at Fretwell 230.

**Tentative Course Schedule**

Below is a tentative schedule (as noted, there is no guarantee that we follow the schedule precisely). We may deviate from the schedule as the course progresses depending on time and it is your responsibility to keep up with adjustments made throughout the course.

**Classes 1 & 2 (January 7 & 9) - Introduction - Impact of the Great Recession**

Our first priority is to get organized. I want to learn about you and your career goals and I will give you the opportunity to learn about me. I will be handing out index cards asking for some information about you, your career goals, etc. From the information you provide I will be making team assignments and a seating chart (I know some would prefer not to have assigned seating, but I think assigned seating will be beneficial).

As you will learn, as a CEO of a Washington, D.C. financial trade association, I experienced the great recession first hand - it had a momentous impact on the industry my staff and I were hired to represent. I will spend a class session going through that with you. It was an experience I would never want to repeat or wish upon anyone else. I hope that my discussion of the real world impact will serve as not only as an introduction to the course, but also heighten your interest in this course.

**Class 3 (January 14) - Financial Crises - A Historical Perspective - Tulipmania**

**Readings:**

Knight, T.  
Peculiar Facts From 500 Years of Finance  
*American Association of Individual Investors Journal*, (May, 2014), pp. 27 - 33  
Available at Moodle2

Was tulipmania irrational?  
*The Economist*, (2014)  
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/10/economic-history
Garber, P.M.
The tulipmania
http://ms.mcmaster.ca/~grasselli/Garber89.pdf

Thompson, E.A.
The tulipmania: Fact or artifact?
University of California, Los Angeles, (2006)

Frehen, R.G.P., Goetzmann, W.N., and Rouwenhorst, K.G.
New Evidence of the First Financial Bubble

As a foundation, we will spend several class sessions discussing the financial crises that have occurred throughout history. As we do so, think about what a crisis is – is it a set of economic conditions? A failure of governance? The result of bad choices, or of uncontrollable forces? Can such events ever be prevented? If so, what are the consequences from a business perspective? Look for parallels throughout the course.

The first documented financial crisis ('Tulipmania') occurred in the early 1660's in Holland. Knight attempts to provide history's lesson as a template to investors (note that the article is from the *American Association of Individual Investors Journal*). Garber presents a relatively comprehensive look at Tulipmania, discussing the traditional view of its causes, and suggesting that the pricing for rare bulbs reflected normal pricing behavior while offering no explanation for the speculation in common bulbs. Thompson takes a different approach. In a rather densely written, but precise account he argues that the market for tulips was an efficient response to changing financial regulation. In a more recent paper, Frehen, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst suggest that innovation was the key driver.

Discussion Questions:

1) What is a “financial crisis”? Is it any crisis involving money? A crisis involving regulatory failures? When GDP drops by some percentage? Is it something that we can only define as, "We know it when we see it?"
2) How, if at all, would you distinguish a crisis from a bubble? Is it necessary we come to joiner on a formal definition?
3) What do you believe was/were the cause(s) of Tulipmania?
4) Do you believe irrationality can ever be employed to describe the basis for a financial crisis or is there always some rational explanation?
5) Is the "irrationality" explanation "one of laziness" as asserted in *The Economist*?
6) What is an options contract? A futures contract? A margin requirement?
7) How, if at all, do options and futures contracts, and margin requirements relate to Tulipmania?

8) Who is right, Gardner or Thompson?

9) Do you agree with Knight - is there a history lesson to be learned? If so, why haven't we learned it, or have we?

10) Was innovation a factor in Tulipmania? If so, from your basic knowledge of the Great Recession can you draw any parallels?

11) Does “Peculiar Facts From 500 Years of Finance” provide a template to enable one to identify a bubble?

Class 4 (January 16) - Financial Crises - A Historical Perspective - The Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles

Readings:

Riding the South Sea Bubble
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, Working Paper 04-02, Dec. 21, 2003
http://ssrn.com/abstract=485482

Walsh, P.
Writing the History of the Financial Crisis: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble,
School of History and Archives, University College Dublin, Working Papers in History and Policy, No. 3, 2012
https://www.academia.edu/1564001/Writing_the_History_of_the_Financial_Crisis_Lessons_from_the_South_Sea_Bubble

Temin and Toth provide a case study of a well-informed investor in the South Sea bubble, arguing that from the perspective of a sophisticated investor, it was profitable to ride the bubble. Drawing on his research on Ireland and the South Sea Bubble, Walsh seeks to explore how historians have dealt with past economic and financial crises and where possible glean any lessons learned.

Discussion Questions:

1) What do you believe was the cause or causes of the South Sea Bubble?

2) Is an understanding of the human impact of financial crisis, as asserted by Walsh important?

3) Do you believe, as postulated by Temin and Toth, that investors in many cases knew that the South Sea Stock was overvalued? If so, why did they continue to buy shares in the stock?

4) What is arbitrage?

5) What is synchronization risk and how, if at all, did it lead, or contribute, to the crisis?
6) Do you agree with Walsh that the global financial crisis of 2007 ("The Great Recession") was not as unprecedented as some have postulated?

7) Why would politicians and policy makers find it attractive to take the position that the Great Recession was unprecedented and could not be foreseen?

8) Can you draw any parallels to Tulipmania?

9) Were the innovative forms of banking and finance (expansion of the stock market, the ubiquity of paper money, the development of a national debt and the emergence of new forms of short-term credit instruments) ‘financial capitalism’ or a ‘financial revolution’?

10) Might a bubble be defined as, “any unsound commercial undertaking accompanied by a high degree of speculation.”

11) If the investment appeared sound at the start – and only foolish in hindsight – would economists classify the event as being driven by market fundamentals?

Class 5 (January 21) - Financial Crises - Historical Perspective - The Bank Panic of 1907

Readings:

Tallman, E. and Moen, J.
Lessons from the Panic of 1907
Economic Review, (May/June 1990), pp. 2 - 13

Tallman, E.W.
The Panic of 1907

Watch the video: The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm (October 17, 2007)
Dean Robert Bruner and Professor Sean Carr
Miller Center, University of Virginia
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/forum/detail/3838

Tallman summarizes the academic literature on the panic, noting that despite the fact the panic occurred over 100 years ago, research continues to uncover data and underexploited connections between institutions. Tallman and Moen examine the circumstances leading to, and the intervention measures taken during the panic. In the video Robert Bruner, Dean of the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration and Sean Carr, Director of Corporate Innovation Programs at the Darden School's Business Institute, discuss the panic of 1907 and the financial crisis of 2008.
Discussion Questions:

1) What caused the crisis of 1907?
2) Do you agree that failure in financial markets is like a vortex in a sink - a pernicious reinforcing downward cycle that gains in momentum and force the longer it runs with ever increasing velocity? If so, how can they be stopped?
3) Drawing on your basic knowledge of the Great Recession, what are the differences between the panic of 1907 and the Great Recession?
4) Do you agree that investors and depositors get what they deserve? If so, from your basic knowledge, was that the case in the Great Recession?
5) What role did financial intermediaries play in the 1907 panic?
6) Did the lack of regulation of some entities contribute to the panic?
7) What intervention measures were taken? How effective were the intervention measures?
8) What role did any unequal regulation of financial institution play in the panic?
9) What role did trust companies play in the panic?
10) Why did the panic of 1907 lead to the creation of the Federal Reserve?
11) What regulatory failures, if any, can be attributed to the crisis?

Classes 6 & 7 (January 23 and 28) - Financial Crises - A Historical Perspective - The Great Depression

Homework Assignment One:

Research and provide a comprehensive listing and brief summary of specific laws enacted during, and immediately following, the Great Depression to facilitate the nation's recovery and/or improve the nation's financial system and financial health. Include a 1 - 2 page assessment of the laws you believe were beneficial and the laws you believe may have inhibited and/or delayed the nation's recovery. Be prepared to discuss in class.

Due at the beginning of Class 6, on January 23.

Readings:

Barrow, R.
An Interview With Robert Barrow on The Lessons from the Great Depression
http://fivebooks.com/interviews/robert-barro-on-lessons-great-depression

Bernanke, B.
Money, Gold and the Great Depression
Remarks at the H. Parker Willis Lecture on Economic Policy
Washington and Lee University (2012)
Bernanke, B.
On Milton Freedman's Ninth Birthday
Remarks at the Conference to Honor Milton Friedman
University of Chicago, (November 8, 2002)

Butkiewicz, J.
Reconstruction Finance Corporation
EH.Net Encyclopedia, (2012)
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/reconstruction-finance-corporation/

Roosevelt. T.R.
Fireside Chat, (March 12, 1933)
http://www.mhric.org/fdr/chat1.html

Roosevelt and Predatory Wealth
Kalgoorlie Western Argus , August 27, 1907

Romer, C.
An interview with Christina Romer on Learning from the Great Depression
http://fivebooks.com/interviews/christina-romer-on-learning-great-depression

Romer, C.
The Nation in Depression
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~cromer/The%20Nation%20in%20Depression.pdf

Romer, C.
What Ended the Great Depression
The Journal of Economic History 52(4), (1992), pp. 757 - 784
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~cromer/What%20Ended%20the%20Great%20Depression.pdf

Romer, C.
An interview with Christina Romer on Learning from the Great Depression (2012)
Five Books
http://fivebooks.com/interviews/christina-romer-on-learning-great-depression

Where Is There Consensus among American Economic Historians?
http://employees.csbsju.edu/jolson/econ315/whaples2123771.pdf
White, E.
The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited
http://www.econ.ku.dk/okocg/Students%20Seminars%C3%98kon-
%C3%98velser/%C3%98velse%202007/artikler/White-1929Crash-JEP1990.pdf

There is a plethora of material on the Great Depression. Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke wrote his doctoral thesis on it. Unfortunately, our time to discuss it is limited. A portion of the FDR fireside chat is also available in an audio file at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/mediaplay.php?id=14540&admin=32 and is interesting as an example of an initial response to a crisis. Listen to it as well as read it – the tone of FDR’s voice is an important part of its effectiveness.

Romer (The Nation in Depression) examines the ways in which the U.S. experience resembled, and fundamentally differed, from that of other countries. Whaples (p 143 - 144 and 149) presents the results of a survey of American economic historians on causes of the Great Depression. Butkiewicz provides an overview of the activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).

In his remarks at Washington and Lee University, Bernanke discusses the causes of the Great Depression and offers a number of lessons learned. Romer (What Ended the Great Depression) examines the source(s) of recovery from the Great Depression. The Five Books interviews with Romer and Barrow briefly addresses their differing thoughts on the lessons of the Great Depression and provide their recommendations for five books on the Great Depression. (Note that Romer was a member of President Obama’s cabinet, serving as Chair of the White House Council of Economic Advisers.) The interview with Barrow takes issue with some of the common assumptions about the Great Depression, while also providing his thoughts on the Obama administration’s Great Recession stimulus package.

Discussion Questions:

1) What are the competing explanations for the Great Depression? Which do you find most convincing? Why?
2) What regulatory failures, if any, can be attributed to the Great Depression?
3) What is your personal view on each of the questions Whaples asked?
4) Does it matter that economists have not been able to reach consensus on the causes and cure for the Great Depression?
5) To what extent was monetary policy a factor in the Great Depression?
6) How did the Roosevelt Administration respond to the Great Depression? What lessons on how to handle a crisis are there from that response?
7) Some have argued that when a financial crisis occurs, it is important for government to “do something” even if the “something” isn’t particularly well thought out or executed. (This is often referred to as the “throw money out of helicopters” theory and why former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke was nick-named, "Helicopter Ben.") Was that true in the Great Depression? Why/why not?
8) How was the Great Depression being used in the debate over our financial crisis? (No
reading on this, just think about what you may have seen/and/or heard/or read.)
9) Imagine you have read these materials and are an aide to President Bush in September
2008. The President asks you what he can do to avoid being thought of as a “second
Herbert Hoover” – what is your advice?
10) What were the source(s) of recovery from the Great Depression?
11) What changes in law were made as a result of the Great Depression? Did the legislation
that was passed into law inhibit or enhance the nation’s recovery?
12) What changes in U.S. federal regulatory structure occurred as a result of the Great
Depression?
13) What parallels exist to the Great Recession? If you believe there are parallels between
the Great Depression and the Great Recession, why didn’t we learn from them?
14) In the speech in honor of Milton Freidman's birthday closed his remarks by stating, "I
would like to say to Milton (Friedman) and Anna (Jacobson Schwartz): regarding the
Great Depression, you're right. We did it. We're very sorry." Do you agree the Federal
Reserve caused the Great Depression? Why?
15) What are your thoughts on Roosevelt's speech on predatory wealth?
16) Who is right, Romer or Barrow?
17) Did Henry Ford cause, or contribute in any way to, the Great Depression? If so, how?
18) What ended the Great Recession?

Classes 8 & 9 (January 30 and February 4) - Financial Crises - A Historical Perspective -
The Saving and Loan Crisis

Readings:

Bode, K.
Where the Streets Are Paved With Depositors
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/16/books/where-the-streets-are-paved-with-depositors.html

Cassak, L.
How Governments React to Financial Crises: The Saving and Loan Crisis as a Test Case
The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society in affiliation with The Centre for Socio-Legal
Studies, (2011)
University of Oxford
https://www.academia.edu/1328422/How_Governments_React_to_Financial_Crises_The_Savings_and_Loan_Crisis_As_a_Test_Case

Green, B.
After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the S&L Crisis
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2925&context=flr
Laughlin, R.J.
Causes of the Savings and Loan Debacle
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2920&context=flr

Rothchild, J.
A Wonderful Life: S&L Hell: The people and the politics Behind the $1 Trillion Savings and Loan Scandal
Los Angeles Times Book Review, (May 9, 1993)
http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-09/books/bk-33020_1_kathleen-day

The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/

The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/167_188.pdf

Zimring, F. and Hawkins, G.
Crime, Justice and the Savings and Loan Crisis
Berkley Law, (January 1, 1993), pp. 247 - 292
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1289&context=facpubs

Start with the FDIC’s chrono-bibliography, it provides a great reference point from an historical perspective. Kathleen Day, a reporter for The Washington Post, broke many of the major stories on the S&L crisis. She later took a leave of absence to write S&L Hell: The People and the politics behind the $1 Trillion savings and loan scandal. S&L Hell offers a comprehensive account of the causes of the crisis, spotlighting the role of the regulators, thrift operators, lobbyists, and politicians. Day's book could be a course into itself. The book review gives you a glimpse. Laughlin provides a nice overview of the crisis. Cassak details the regulatory responses as the crisis unfolded.

Discussion Questions:

1) What did commercial banks do in the 1920s? Does this mix of activities make sense?
2) Why do panics occur?
3) What do you believe were the causes of the S&L debacle?
4) How would you judge the government's reaction to the crisis?
5) What role did deposit insurance play in the crisis?
6) Should Roosevelt have agreed to deposit insurance? Why not simply maintain the status quo?
7) Were there alternative reforms of the banking system that were preferable from an economic point of view? From a political point of view?
8) Why did Congressman Glass want to separate commercial and investment banks? Were his arguments compelling? Are there other reasons to do it?
9) Why was there a crisis in 1933? How was it solved?
10) What is systemic risk? Does deposit insurance (note it is now at $250,000) create systemic risk? If so, how?
11) What regulatory failures, if any, can be attributed to the crisis?
12) Do you agree with Laughlin that timely action could have avoided the crisis?

Class 10 (February 6) - Financial Crises - A Historical Perspective - The 1987 Crash

Readings:

Cashin, A.
Black Monday, An Unforgettable Single Day
The Big Picture, (October 19, 2012)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/10/art-cashin-black-monday-an-unforgettable-single-day/

Carlson, M.
A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash with a Discussion of the Federal Reserve Response
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, (2007)
Revisiting the 1987 Crash
The Big Picture, (October 19, 2012)
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/10/revisiting-the-1987-crash/

French, K.R.
Crash-Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10957.pdf

Greenwald, B. and Stein, J.
The Task Force Report: The Reasoning Behind the Recommendations
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.2.3.3

McKeon, R. and Netter, J.
What Caused the 1987 Stock Market Crash and Lessons for the 2008 Crash
Social Science Research Network, (2009)
Ritholtz, B.
October 19, 1987: Dow Down 22%
The Big Picture, (October 19, 2012)

Shiller, R
Investor Behavior in the October 1987 Stock Market Crash Survey Evidence

Vigna, P. (2012)
Crash of '87 Recollections: "My Singularly Worst-Day Ever"
The Wall Street Journal, (October 19, 2012)
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/10/19/crash-of-87-recollections-my-singularly-worst-day-ever/

Watch either the Nightly Business Report, (Oct.19, 1987)
or

After the Crash: Louis Rukeyser Wall Street Week, (Oct., 23, 1997)

McKeon and Netter assert that the large three-day drop from October 14 to October 16 led to the Monday morning crash of October 19, 1987. Shiller provides the results of a survey sent to individuals and institutional investors inquiring about their behavior during the crash. Carlson reviews the events surrounding the crashes and discussed the Federal Reserve's response. The video's provide a sense of the public's reaction to the crisis.

Discussion Questions:

1) Imagine that your were running the floor for PaineWebber on Monday morning, October 19, how would you have reacted that day?
2) Should the crash have been anticipated given the substantial market downturn the Thursday and Friday immediately preceding?
3) How do you interpret the results of Shiller's survey?
4) Prior to the crash were there any expressions of concern by the press that the market was over-valued?
5) What impact did M&A activity have on stock prices before the crash?
6) What were dividend yields before, and immediately following, the crash?
7) Was there a “trigger” that led to the crash? If so, what was it?
8) What is the efficient market hypothesis?
9) Do you believe in the efficient market hypothesis? If so, how do you rationalize the October 1987 crash?
10) What new news over the weekend before the crash would have changed market fundamentals so as to support the efficient market hypothesis?
11) Were the weekend's events, either standing alone or in combination, sufficient to change investors fundamental expectations about the market?
12) Do you believe the market has a “life of its own,” unrelated to economic fundamentals?
13) Was the crash an inevitable collapse of a speculative bubble?
14) If the crash was the result of a speculative bubble, why were investors still buying stocks before the stock market began its decline on October 14, 1987?
15) Was program trading the cause of the crisis?
16) How is volatility in the markets measured?
17) What do you believe causes volatility in the markets?
18) Given that individuals can trade 24-7, why is there increased volatility in the market when the exchanges are open?
19) What is a margin call? How did margin calls exacerbate the 1987 crash?
20) Why were mutual fund managers forced to sell?
21) How did banks respond to the crisis?
22) What actions did the Reagan administration take as a result and why?
23) What actions did the Fed take as a result and why?
24) How do you judge the Federal Reserve's response? Did it save the day?
25) How important was the nature of the Fed’s public activities?
26) What impact did the Fed’s statement before the opening of the financial markets on Tuesday have on market sediments?
27) How, if at all, was the Administration’s and Fed’s response different in 1987 from 1929?
28) Was the market’s performance more important on Tuesday, October 20, than it was on Monday, October 19th? If so, why?
29) Could the government have taken regulatory action to prevent the crisis? If so, what regulatory actions might it have taken and should it have done so?
30) What explanations are there for the 1987 crash? Which explanation to find most compelling?
31) Why wasn’t the 1987 crash a repeat of 1929?
32) What impact did computerized trading have?
33) Why do you think the Brady Commission’s recommendations were limited to market mechanisms as opposed to fundamental economic issues?
34) What are circuit breakers and why were they imposed following the 1987 crash?
35) What are the arguments for and against circuit breakers?
36) Contrast the market crash of 1987 to that of 2008.
37) How, if at all, would you distinguish, if at all, 1987’s stock market from today’s?
38) Where was Peter Lynch, the portfolio manager of Fidelity Magellan, on October 19, 1987?
Class 11 (February 11) - Financial Crises - A Historical Perspective - The Dot.com Bubble

Readings:

Goodnight, T. and Green, S.
Rhetoric, Risk and Markets: The Dot-Com Bubble
Available at UNCC Library

Morris, J.J. and Alam, P.
Analysis of the Dot-com Bubble of the 1990s
CFA Institute, (2008)

Redhead, K.
A Behavioral Model of the Dot.com Bubble and Crash
Routledge Publishing

Redhead examines market bubbles and crashes and suggests that psychology and sociology are, at a minimum, as important as financial and economics in explaining such events. Morris and Alam document the decline in the relationship between market value and traditional accounting information during the bubble, while recognizing irrational exuberance and the aggressiveness of financial analysis forecasts as possible explanations for the Dot.com bubble. Goodnight and Green assert that economics and rhetoric should switch places.

Discussion Questions:

1) Was the dot.com phenomenon a bubble or a crash? What “triggered” the Dot.com bubble?
2) If a company added Dot.com or dot.net to its name, what impact did that have on its stock price?
3) Was the Federal Reserve's monetary policy responsible for the Dot.com bubble? If so, to what extent?
4) Did the Fed see, or should the Fed have seen, the Dot.com bubble coming? If so, what action should they have taken, if any, and why? Said another way, can bubbles be managed? If so, should they be and how?
5) What impact did Chairman Greenspan’s statement of “irrational exuberance” have?
6) Does the crash of the Dot.com’s mean that as a group these stock lacked economic potential or were badly managed?
7) In 1997 Congress passed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, lowering the maximum tax on capital gains for individual investors from 28 percent to 20 percent for assets held more than 18 months. The dividend tax rate was left unchanged. Might this have impacted the desire for, and volatility of, growth stocks?
8) Are psychology and sociology as important as finance and economics in explaining events such as the Dot.com bubble and crash?
9) To what extent can the Dot.com bubble attributed to the decline in market value and traditional accounting? To the irrational exuberance theory? To the aggressiveness of financial analysts' forecasts? Should economics and rhetoric switch places as postulated by Goodnight and Green?
10) What regulatory failures, if any, can be attributed to the crisis?
11) What is momentum investing? Does it make sense?
12) What action(s) did Congress take following the Dot.com bubble?
13) What rationale could investors have used in ignoring traditional financial evaluation methods?
14) Was the Federal Reserve's monetary policy responsible for the Dot.com bubble? To what extent?
15) Are psychology and sociology as important as finance and economics in explaining events such as the Dot.com Bubble and crash?

Class 12 (February 13) - The Financial Regulatory System

Homework Two:

You work for a newly elected Congressman/Congresswoman who has just been appointed to the House Financial Services Committee. The Congressman/Congresswoman, comes from a small farming family and has only limited knowledge of the financial regulatory system. The Chief of Staff has asked that you write a short (4 - 6) page briefing paper for the Congressman/Congresswoman explaining the financial regulatory system in the United States. The Congressman/Congressman wants to know what regulatory agencies are responsible for overseeing the financial system. He/she wants to know why were these regulatory agencies were created and what entities these agencies regulate and if there is duplication in their oversight. He/she is also interested in learning what reforms and/or re-structuring various administrations may have proposed, if any, in the past and why. He/she has asked that you provide your views on those recommendations.

Finally, the Congressman/Congresswoman has read that Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) and others have raised concerns regarding the Federal Reserve system. He/she wants to know what concerns have been recently raised (following the Great Recession) and why. He/she wants to know if any of these concerns have merit and why.

Due at the beginning of Class 12 on February 13
Readings:

Dodaro, G.
Acting Comptroller General of the United States
Testimony Before the Congressional Oversight Panel, GAO-09-310T, (2009)
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc291487/m2/1/high_res_d/121456.pdf

Jickling, M. and Murphy, E
Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of U.S. Financial Supervision
Congressional Research Service, (December 8, 2010)
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40249.pdf

Kaplan, T.
The Federal Reserve: What the Hell Is It?

Teslik, H
The U.S. Financial Regulatory System
Council on Foreign Relations, (October 2, 2008)

Voakes, G. and Cooege, C.
Info graphic: Uncovering The Fed
Business Insider, (July 18, 2012)

Kaplan provides a capsule overview of the Federal Reserve. In his infographic, Voakes explores the controversy over the Federal Reserve, including some interesting facts. Dodaro's statement provides a suggested framework for modernizing the U.S. financial regulatory system.

Discussion Questions:

1) What is the Federal Reserve? Why does it exist? Imagine you work for a Member of Congress who asks you, "setting aside the politics, is there any substance to Rand Paul's concerns?" How do you answer?

2) Think about the different regulatory agencies described by Jickling and Murphy. Why do we have so many regulators? Are there too many? Does the number of overlapping regulators provide the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage? What is different about the various agencies? Which ones, if any, failed (and how), based on your current understanding of the economic events and policies leading to Great Recession?
3) What changes, if any, would you make in the U.S. financial regulatory system and why?
4) Why not allow financial institutions to self-regulated?
5) What should be the functions of financial regulators?
6) How was the U.S. financial regulatory system developed?
7) How do you measure economic power in government?
8) What are the four components to U.S. banking regulation?
9) What goals does the GAO articulate for a financial regulatory system?
10) What gaps existed in the system that the GAO indicted contributed to the Great Recession? Are there any gaps today?
11) What are the advantages of a federal charter? Of a state charter?
12) Should there be only a federal charter?
13) How many times has regulatory restructuring been proposed in the United States?
14) Why has regulatory restructuring of financial services failed?
15) Why do you think Dodd-Frank eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)?
16) Why did Dodd-Frank create the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)?
17) Why did Dodd-Frank create the Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB)?
18) What changes did Dodd-Frank make to the Federal Reserve's powers and authorities and why?
19) What are Senator’s Paul’s concerns about the Fed? Do you agree? What changes, if any, would you make in the U.S. financial regulatory system and why?

Class 13 (February 18) - Background on derivatives, hedge funds, short selling and collateralized mortgage obligations

Readings:

Adelson, M. and Bernmelen, M.
CDOs in Plain English: A Summer Inters' Letter Home

Eichengreen, B. and Mathieson, D.
Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know?
International Monetary Fund, Economic Issue No. 19, (September 1999)

Hawkesby, C.
A primer on derivatives market
Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bulletin No, 62, No. 2
Shadab, H.  
The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds  

Stowe, D.  
Executive Summary  
Financial Risk Management Primer  
*Strategic Treasurer*, (2007)  

Whetten, M., Adelson, M., and Bernmelen, M  
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) Primer  
http://finpko.faculty.ku.edu/myssi/FIN425/Articles%20on%20Liquidity%20Crisis%20of%20Sept%202008/Nomura_CDS_Primer_12May04.pdf

Some argue that hedge funds, derivatives and short selling played a role in the Great Recession. These readings introduce some of the crucial financial instruments arguably involved in the financial crisis. Our goal is for you to have an understanding of (1) why these instruments appeared; (2) why their use may have become problematic; and, (3) what regulatory steps might be appropriate and which ones might not be. The Whitten and Adelson articles are clear, concise explanations of what CDO and CDS instruments are. Note that these were written before the crisis by a firm that sold CDS and CDO products. (How does that affect how you read these articles?) The Hawkesby piece endeavors to describe derivatives in simple terms. The Shadab article is a post-crisis, skeptical analysis of regulatory efforts plus a good description of how the CDO-CDS market works. (Shadab is one of the best writers on financial regulation around.)

**Discussion Questions**

1) What is a derivative? Why would one purchase a derivative? Why would want sell a derivative?  
2) What is a credit default swap (CDS)? would one purchase a CDS? Why would want sell a CDS?  
3) What is the size of the derivatives market today? The CDS market?  
4) Who are the largest players in the CDS market?  
5) Who sells CDS?  
6) How are CDS premiums calculated?  
7) What are the “trigger events” for payment of a CDS?  
8) What is a synthetic CDO?  
9) Why did problems with the junk bond market in 2001 and 2002 cause problems with CDOs?  
10) What is credit trenching?  
11) Why diversify?
12) What is correlation? How important are predictions to correlation estimation?
13) What problems should regulators being trying to solve with respect to CDS/CDO and derivatives markets? What problems should they leave to market mechanisms? Who should regulators protect in regulating CDS/CDO and derivatives markets?
14) Why and when were Over-The-Counter derivatives exempted from capital adequacy requirements, disclosure and regulatory rules?
15) What was the value of the Over-The-Counter derivatives market at the time it was deregulated?
16) How much had AIG underwritten in CDS and how much did it place in reserves?
17) Given the global nature of financial markets, can one country effectively regulate such instruments? Even if most countries cannot, can the United States?
18) Should a key principle of financial regulation be, “to supervise financial products based on the actual data and how people make financial decisions?”
19) What is a hedge fund?
20) Were hedge funds totally unregulated?
21) If hedge funds investors must be high net worth individuals with investment sophistication, why should they be regulated?
22) Should governments supervise and regulate all investment vehicles? If so, to what should be the goals of such regulation and to what extent should investment vehicles be regulated? Given the need for risk management described by Stowe, what new problems might regulating CDS/CDO markets create?

Classes 14 and 15 - (February 20 & 25) - **Background on the Great Recession**

Readings:

Acharya, V, Phillppon, T., Richardson, M. and Roubini, N
A Birds-Eye View
The Financial Crisis of 2007 - 2008, Causes and Remedies

Gorton, G. and Metrick, A
Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide
Yale University and the National Bureau of Economic Research. (January 15, 2012)

Kliesen, K.
Book Review: This Time It's Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly
*The Region*, (September 2010)
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4540&

Lo, A.W.
What An Economist Learned From Reading 21 Books About The Crisis
August 8, 2012
Let's now turn to the Great Recession. We will be debating the causes for decades (as we are still debating the causes of the Great Depression). Gorton and Metrick cover the key facts and mechanisms in the build-up of risk, the panics in the short-term debt markets, the policy reactions and the real effects of the crisis. Lo reviews a diverse set of twenty-one books, some written by academics, some by journalists and one by a former Treasury Secretary. Temin discusses the parallels between the Great Depression and the Great Recession. The title to Reinhardt and Rogoff's book, *This Time It's Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*, says it all. Ritholz blames regulatory changes and the Fed. Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini call for a redesign of the regulatory overlay of the global financial system.

**Discussion Questions:**

1) What do you believe was (were) the cause(s) of the Great Recession?
2) Was there a single spark that lit it off?
3) Why can't economists come to joinder on the cause(s)?
4) What does the fact economists cannot come to joinder on the cause(s) indicate about the profession?
5) Was the Great Recession a case of people losing their fear in the climate of prosperity, thereupon becoming more relaxed (like someone who has had a little too much to drink), becoming lulled in a false sense of security, safety and prosperity, thereafter cutting corners and building in the kind of risks that end in financial crisis?
6) Was the Great Recession no different than any other financial crisis, or was it truly different?
7) To what extent did technology and innovation play in the crisis?
8) Why didn't the greatest financial minds in the country (Greenspan, Bernanke) see it coming? Should they have seen the crisis on the horizon and taken action to curtail it? If so, what action(s) should have been taken and why?
9) Should Lehman have been saved?
10) What parallels, if any, can you draw to the Great Depression?
11) Are there any parallels in causation of the financial crises we have been discussing?
12) What actions did the government take to restore stability in each instance?
13) Was Wall Street unfounded in assuming that “this time it is different” - risk in the housing market had been diversified away by CDOs and CDS’s?
14) How important is trust to financial markets? What institutions provide that trust?
15) What is a subprime mortgage?
16) What is the difference between “originating-to-hold” and originating-to-distribute?
17) What percent of loans were subprime in 2006?
18) Why did the number of subprime loans increase so dramatically?
19) To what extent did “originating-to-distribute” contribute to the crisis?
20) What is securitization?
21) How much did securitization grow in the years immediately preceding the crises?
22) What impact did increased securitization have on the crisis?
23) What is a shadow bank?
24) What led to the growth of the shadow banking system?
25) What impact did shadow banks have on the crisis?
26) What is a repo?
27) What impact did repos have on the crisis?
28) What is “mark-to-market” accounting? How did it become problematic during the crisis?
29) Why is high inflation equivalent to default by the government?
30) To what extent were large capital inflows to the United States responsible for the crisis?
31) Can ever-improving forms of self-mentoring and institutional advance prevent financial crises from occurring?
32) What is regulatory capture? Can regulatory capture be blamed for the crisis?
33) What about greed? Can it be regulated or prevented?
34) Is a “this time it's different syndrome” likely to result in future crises? If so, how do we overcome it?
35) Why do banking crises tend to be contagious?
36) Did the efficient market hypothesis lead investors astray causing them to ignore the possibility that securitized debt was mispriced and that the real-estate bubble could burst?
37) Was the decline in housing prices and the prospect of subprime loan defaults in and of itself sufficient to cause the crisis?
38) Were Wall Street compensation contracts too focused on short-term trading profits rather than long-term invectives?
39) Why are bubbles asymmetric, i.e., why do so few investors try to take advantage of an obvious bubble and why do even fewer investors manage to profit from bubbles?
40) Does an acceleration in economy wide-leverage and debt portend of a financial crisis?
41) Why do households, governments, institutions, financial market participants, economists, and business consistently underestimate the fragility of highly leveraged economies?
42) What early warning signs would you identify as portending of a future crisis?
43) Did investment banks greatly increase their leverage in the years leading to the crisis as a result of an SEC rule-change?
44) Is evidence of a bubble, “rapid prices increases” or, “a situation in which excessive public expectations of future price increases cause prices to be temporarily elevated?”
45) Does money market mutual fund performance predominantly increase on the basis of investment manager skill or risk?
46) What were the attributes of the money market funds that saw larger runs?
47) What event triggered the run on money market mutual funds?
48) What stopped the run on money market mutual funds?
49) What impact did the Lehman bankruptcy have on money market funds and why?
50) What broad based impact did the Lehman bankruptcy have on the money markets and why??
51) What happened to liquidity as the crisis continued to unfold?
52) What happened to the credit markets as the crisis continued to unfold?
53) Is it critical that government support market function and cushion the blow of an economic crisis?
54) What is “breaking the buck”?
55) How large was the repo market in the years immediately preceding the crisis?
56) Was the Great Recession a case of people losing their fear in the climate of prosperity, there upon becoming more relaxed (like someone who has had a little too much to drink), becoming lulled in a false sense of security, safety and prosperity, thereafter cutting corners and building in the kind of risks that end in financial crisis?

Class 16 – (February 27) - The Housing Bubble, Subprime Mortgages & Securitization

Readings:

Doherty, B  
The Housing Boom and Bust  
Reason.com, (May 20, 2009)  

Jickling, M.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship  
Congressional Research Service, (September 15, 2008)  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110097.pdf

Katz, A.  
The Rise and Fall of Fannie Mae: A Timeline  
AOL Real Estate, Updated December 26, 2010  
Kosar, K.  
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs): An Institutional Overview  
Congressional Research Service, (April 23, 2007)  
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21663.pdf

Pickert, K.  
A Brief History of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
Time Magazine, (July 14, 2008)  
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1822766,00.html

Schwartz, H.  
Housing, Global Finance and American Hegemony: Building Conservative Politics One Brick at a Time  
Comparative European Politics, Vol., 6, (2008), pp. 262 - 284  
http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3903/1/Housing%20Global%20Finance%20and%20American%20Hegemony.pdf

Democrat Barney Frank admits his role in causing the recession (2010)  
Wintery Knight Blog, (October 15, 2010)  

Watch The You Tube Video: SubPrime Mortgage Mess Explained  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q8hjUei-Nwo

The CRS studies outline some of the basics issues and facts involved in the subprime housing bubble. The timeline from AOL Real Estate provides a brief history of Fannie and Freddie. The Time article, published just before the September 2008 conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie, provides a further historical synopsis and overview of the 2 main government actors. The Doherty interview of Thomas Sowell summarize Sowell’s conservative, free-market assessment of the problem. The Schwartz article is a left-wing critique of the causes of the crisis. These readings should (a) give you an overview of the issue and (b) provide examples of quite different explanations for the solutions offered by those who favor markets and are suspicious of governments and those who find markets questionable and put more trust in the public sector.

Discussion Questions:

1) What do Fannie and Freddie do?  
2) What is a GSE?  
3) How many GSE’s are there?  
4) What percent of mortgages were purchased by Freddie and Fannie in 2008? What percentage are purchased today?  
5) Why would a bank (or other lenders) sell a loan to Fannie/Freddie?  
6) What impact did the implicit federal government guarantee of Fannie and Freddie have on mortgage rates?
7) What were the causes of the housing bubble/subprime crisis?
8) What role did securitization play in the crisis?
9) Did Freddie and Fannie contribute to the problem? If so, what might be done to prevent such problems in the future? What competitive advantages do Fannie and Freddie have?
10) What four key characteristic define the U.S., housing market?
11) How, if at all, are housing prices related to interest rates?
12) Is mortgage securitization good or bad?
13) Did all subprime lending go to poor households?
14) Why do banks have a closer relationship to the government than other commercial entities?
15) How important is if for elected officials to do special things to get re-elected?
16) How is the U.S. housing and mortgage market different from that of other countries?
17) Should Fannie and Freddie be dissolved? If so, what would be the consequences?
18) What is the role of Congressional oversight in supervising GSEs like Freddie and Fannie? Do some research in news archives – what sort of complaints do people have about how Congressional oversight was handled? What criticisms have been raised about the role of individual Congressmen and Senators with respect to oversight of Freddie and Fannie?
19) What is the role of Executive branch in supervising GSEs? Should GSEs be treated differently than administrative agencies directly responsible to the President (e.g. the Department of Housing and Urban Development)? Was the GSE structure appropriate for Freddie and Fannie?
20) What kind of solutions do Schwartz and Sowell suggest to prevent the problems that produced the housing bubble and subprime crisis in the future? Which is more convincing? Why?
21) Did “politics” contribute to the housing bubble?
22) Did the efficient market hypothesis lead investors astray causing them to ignore the possibility that securitized debt was mispriced and that the real-estate bubble could burst?
23) Was the decline in housing prices and the prospect of subprime loan defaults in and of itself sufficient to cause a crisis?
24) Why did the housing market collapse of the Great Recession have a greater impact on the economy than the Dot.com crash or the 1987 stock market crash?
25) Were Wall Street compensation contracts too focused on short term trading profits rather than long term invectives?
26) To what extent were large capital inflows to the United States responsible for the crisis?
27) Can regulatory capture be blamed for the housing crisis?
28) Can greed be blamed for the housing crisis?

No classes, Spring Recess (March 2 - 7)
Classes 17 and 18 (March 11 & 13) - The Financial Crises Inquiry Report

Briefing Paper Due At Beginning of Class 17, on Wednesday March 11

Readings:

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, January 2011

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report is over 600 pages in length with appendices. Reviewing the report in its entirety would take a semester. That said, as noted in a January 2011 article by Gretchen Morgenson in the *New York Times*, the report is in and of itself, "A Bank Crisis Whodunit with Laughs and Tears." The commission was created "to examine the causes of the financial and economic crisis in the United States." Its statutory instructions set out twenty-two specific area for inquiry and called for the examination of the collapse of major financial institutions that failed, or world have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government. The commission was not asked to offer policy recommendations or evaluate federal law (TARP) (evaluation of TARP was undertaken separately by the Congressional Oversight Panel and the Special Inspector General for TARP). The Commission members were appointed to an independent 10-member panel, six members appointed by the Democratic leadership of the Congress and four members by the Republican leadership. As you might, therefore, surmise, there was disagreement on the final report, with dissenting views. Focus on the preface (pp. xi-xii), the Conclusion of the Commission (pp. xv - xxviii), and the dissenting views (pp. 411 - 439 and 443 - 538 (read the introduction and summary of Wallison's dissent (485 - 538)). Note that not even the dissenters agreed!

Discussion Questions:

1) Why was the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission formed?
2) Who commissioned it?
3) Who were its members?
4) Who appointed its members?
5) What was its statutory mission?
6) What were the topics of inquiry?
7) What was the central question the commission’s majority says it faced?
8) There is disagreement among the commissioners as to the extent that the lack of federal regulation and federal regulatory supervision contributed to the crisis. Which side do you take? Why? What was the spark that the commission’s majority indicated ignited a string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008? What fueled that spark? What magnified those losses? What were the warning signals?
9) What changes does the commission's majority indicate occurred in the financial system in the decades preceding the crisis. What about Wallison’s assertion, “why
have it (the commission) if Congress is going to proceed to enact Dodd-Frank before
the commission completes its report?”

10) Who does the commission’s majority blame for the failure to stem the flow of toxic
mortgages?

11) What is leverage?

12) How high were Fannie and Freddie leveraged?

13) Are some firms too big to manage?

14) How highly leveraged were the large investment banks?

15) What role does the commission’s majority indicate the financial industry itself played
in weakening regulatory constraints?

16) What’s was wrong with the short-term borrowing the large investment banks had
undertaken? Has short-term borrowing led to other crisis in history?

17) What happened to national mortgage debt in the years preceding the crisis?

18) To what extent does the commission’s majority indicate greed was responsible for the
crisis?

19) To what extent does the commission’s majority conclude excess liquidity was the
cause of the crisis?

20) What does the commission’s majority say about Fannie and Freddie’s business
model?

21) What is the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)? To what extent was CRA
responsible for the crisis?

22) What is a credit spread? What happened to credit spreads in the years immediately
preceding the crisis?

23) What are the factors the minority identifies as contributing to the housing bubble?

24) How did Fed Chairman Bernanke sum up the housing bubble?

25) What does the minority report indicate as to the contribution of derivatives to the
crisis?

26) Do you agree with the conclusions of the majority or minority?

27) Is the crisis report a political document?

28) There is disagreement among the commissioners as to the extent that the lack of
federal regulations and federal regulatory supervision contributed to the crisis. Which
side do you take? Why?

29) Do you believe, as the majority asserts, that with proper federal regulation and
supervision the crisis could have been avoided?

30) Was the crisis a “perfect storm?” If so, can perfect storms ever be avoided? If so how?
Is avoiding a perfect storm tantamount to removing risk from the financial market
place?

31) What conclusions does the commission’s majority make?

32) What does the minority indicate were the essential causes of the crisis?

33) How in essence does the commission’s majority’s conclusions differ from that of the
minority? What does the minority report indicate was the cause of the credit bubble?

34) Do you believe, as the majority asserts, that with proper federal regulation and
supervision the crisis could have been avoided?

35) What do you believe were the essential causes of the crisis? To what extent did each
cause contribute to the crisis? Said another way, had any cause or causes been
eliminated or mitigated in some way, could the crisis have been avoided?
36) Was there a "spark" that lit the crisis? If so what was it?
37) Wallison assets that none of the reasons cited by the commission alone, or in
combination, caused the crisis? Do you agree? If so, what do you think cause the
 crisis?
38) Why couldn't the commissioners reach an agreement?
39) What does the fact the commissioners could not reach agreement portend for the
country?
40) What role(s) should government play in housing policy?
41) Was the government's housing policy a contributing factor to the crisis? If so, to
what extent?
42) To what extent did the Federal Reserve's monetary policy contribute to the crisis?
43) What is a non-traditional mortgage (NTM)? To what extend did NTMs contribute
to the crisis? If NTMs had not existed would the crises have been avoided?
44) Was the crisis a "perfect storm?" If so, can perfect storms ever be avoided? If so,
how? Is avoiding a perfect storm tantamount to removing risk from the financial
market place?

Classes 19 and 20 - (March 18 & 20) - Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)

Readings:

Binder, A. and Zandi, M.
How the Great Recession Was Brought to an End, (July 27, 2010)


While not a lengthy as the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, the Final Report of the
Congressional Oversight Panel on TARP (196 pages), is a lot to digest (the commission held
over 20 hearings across the country). Read the Executive Summary (pp. 1-4) and
Introduction (pp. 5-21). Then read the lessons learned under each subsection and the
Conclusions and Lesson Learned (pp. 151-160). The study by Alan Binder and Mark
Zandi provides a unique analytical insight into TARPs effectiveness.

Discussion Questions:

1) How did Fed Chairman Bernanke describe the course the nation was on?
2) How did Chairman Bernanke describe the magnitude of actions the Fed would take?
3) What were the broad goals of the government in confronting the Great Recession?
4) What was the problem with the banking system in 2008, i.e., was it that banks lacked
enough capital or that they held so many sub-prime mortgage loans?
5) What traditional central bank actions did the Federal Reserve take to stave-off the
unfolding crisis? Compare those actions to those taken during the Great Depression
and the 1987 stock market crash?
6) What is the discount window?
7) Why was there a stigma in borrowing from the discount window?
8) What did the Fed and the Treasury Department do to mitigate the stigma from borrowing from the discount window?
9) What non-traditional central bank actions did the Federal Reserve take to stave-off the unfolding crisis?
10) What legislation was passed to accomplish the government’s broad goals in confronting the Great Recession?
11) How did Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke initially propose using TRAP funds?
12) What happened on September 29th following the introduction of TARP?
13) What was the reaction of the stock market when ARP's passage originally failed?
14) Does the stock market set federal government policy?
15) How long did it take to pass TARP?
16) Why did the Treasury Department choose not to buy troubled assets under TARP as Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke had initially proposed? What alternative action was taken?
17) What impact did the change in use of TARP funds have from a public perspective?
18) What was the broad based intent of the Fed and the Treasury in the capital infusion to banks?
19) What restrictions were initially placed on the banks that took TARP funds? What problems did that cause? What was HAMP and why did it fail?
20) To what extent did the commission indicate TARP helped the American homeowner?
21) What Treasury action did the commission indicate played the greatest role in calming the makers and halting the financial panic?
22) What has happened to the size of the big banks since the crisis?
23) To what extent did TARP create “moral hazard” and why?
24) Did TARP exacerbate the too big to fail concept?
25) What actions did Treasury take that the commission indicates further increased moral hazard and why?
26) What actions does the commission indicate Treasury and the Fed could have taken to reduce the likelihood of increased moral hazard?
27) How did the commission indicate Treasury's implementation made things worse?
28) What does the commission indicate about transparency?
29) To what extent and why did the commission indicate TARP distorted the financial market place?
30) How many times is the word “unpopular” used in the report?
31) Did TARP make things better or worse?
32) Did TARP achieve its stated purpose?
33) Is the government becoming better at managing a financial crisis?
34) What do you believe were TARP's successes and failures?
35) For how long was TARP in place?
36) To what extent does the commission indicate TARP deserved credit for preventing the Recession from becoming the Great Depression?
37) Was TARP necessary?
38) In a crisis, is it always necessary for the government to be seen as doing something?
39) Think about each of lesson learned subsections - what are your thoughts on each?
40) Did TARP prevent another Great Depression? Why or why not?
41) Does TARP deserve the public stigma that exists when the "four letter acronym is mentioned?
42) How important is communication to the public when legislation such as TARP is created?
43) Did TARP only benefit Wall Street or where there also benefits to main street?
44) Think back to the South Sea Bubble and to the Frehen, Goetzmann and Rouwenhorst paper, New Evidence of the First Financial Bubble. To what extent was innovation in the securities market a contributor to the Great Recession?
45) Does the report by Alan Binder and Mark Zandi change your view of TARP? Said another way, knowing what you know now would you defend TARP?

Classes 21 and 22 - (March 25 & 27)) - The Enactment of Dodd-Frank

Readings:

Kaiser, R.
'Act of Congress': How Barney Frank foiled the banking lobby to form a new financial watchdog.
The Washington Post, (May, 2013)

Irwin, N.
Robert Kaiser on Dodd-Frank: 'This example of Congress working also illuminated why it works so rarely'
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/22/robert-kaiser-on-dodd-frank-this-example-of-congress-working-also-illuminated-why-it-works-so-rarely/

U.S. Senate Floor Debate on Dodd-Frank Conference Report
Congressional Record, (July 14, 2010)
Proceedings and Debates of the 11th Congress, Second Session

Before we dive into the substance of Dodd-Frank itself, we should review the Senate floor debate on Dodd-Frank. Illuminating of the political process is the book by Robert Kaiser, 'Act of Congress: 'How America's Essential Institution Works, and How It Doesn't'. We do not have time to read the book, but it does provide an interesting account of how "sausage was made" in the passage of Dodd-Frank. The Congressional Record is long (over one-hundred pages). Note, however, that interspersed among the debate on Dodd-Frank are numerous other items - skip those in your reading.
Discussion Questions:

1) Is, as former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan states, the, “financial system far more complex than lawmakers, and even most regulators apparently contemplate? If so, can it effectively be regulated?
2) What does Dodd-Frank do?
3) What is the purpose of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FOSC)?
4) What is the purpose of the Office of Financial Research (OFR)?
5) What is the purpose of the stress tests? To what entities are the stress tests applied? What are the criteria for the stress tests?
6) Was Dodd-Frank necessary?
7) Should Dodd-Frank be repealed?
8) Should Dodd-Frank have gone further in overhauling the financial regulatory system?
9) Should Dodd-Frank have gone further in overhauling the financial regulatory system?
10) If you were Senator Scott Brown would you have voted against Dodd-Frank?
11) What does the fact that nearly half of the rule-making remains say about the regulatory agencies?
12) What is the orderly liquidation authority? Is a Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB), akin to the Consumer Products Safety Commission necessary?
13) What does Senator Durbin indicate the CFPB will accomplish?
14) Does Dodd-Frank, as asserted by Senator Tester, “end once and for all taxpayer funded bailouts of Wall Street banks and investment firms,” and “get rid of any notion that any private company can somehow be “too big to fail?,” and, as asserted by Senator Murray, guarantee that American taxpayers will never again have to pay to bail our Wall Street or to clean up after big bank’s messes?”
15) How does the bill protect individuals such as Devin Glaser (Senator Murray) who put twenty percent down on a condo, is now unemployed, and faces foreclosure?
16) Is financial literacy the key to keeping consumers financially stable?
17) Does the bill as asserted by Senator Bond, ignore the 800-pound gorilla in the room (Fannie and Freddie)?
18) How important was it for members of Congress to be perceived by the public as bashing Wall Street?
19) Should the CFPB have been governed by a Board?
20) What does Senator Corker indicate the bill does to the cost of capital?
21) Why did Dodd-Frank need 60 votes to pass in the Senate?
22) To what extent does the bill accomplish the objectives set forth by Senator Dodd – “to end too big to fail and to end … bailouts?” “to grow jobs and create wealth,” “to empower consumers and investors?”
23) Does Senator Dodd indicate that the bill will stop another economic crisis?
24) Did the regulators have the capacity and the ability to indentify, to spot early on, and the tools to prevent the crisis and just not employ them, as asserted by Senator Corker, or not have the tools as asserted by Senator Dodd?
25) Should the bill have included an outright ban on too big to fail bailouts?
26) How does Senator Levin describe the relationship between Washington Mutual and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)?
27) What concerns are expressed regarding the provisions in the bill on derivatives?
28) What concerns are expressed about the Office of Financial Research (OFR)?
29) What is the Congressional Budget Act of 1974? How was it to be violated?
30) How did Congress get around the constraints of the Congressional Budget Act?
31) Should the prudential (safety and soundness) regulators have been given veto authority over a CFPB proposed rulemaking?
32) Should the CFPB have been funded directly, rather than through the Fed?
33) What were the three goals Senator Warner indicated that the legislation should have? How does the legislation achieve those goals?
34) Does the bill delegate too much to the regulators?
35) What does Senator Kaufman state about writing laws? Is Dodd-Frank “sweeping overhaul,” or as Senator McCain asserts, does the “legislation … (do) little, if anything—to tackle the tough problems facing the financial sector, nor … institute real, meaningful and comprehensive reform?
36) What does Senator McCain indicate is the biggest problem with the legislation? What false remedies does he identify?
37) What does Senator Feingold indicate that Glass-Steagall should have been re-imposed?
38) Are the differences between R’s and D’s over the bill’s enactment substantively or ideology based?
39) Why were Senators opposing the legislation citing the concerns of farmers?
40) Does too big to fail still exists? What advantages does that give to too big to fail institutions? Can there ever be an orderly write-down of today's “too big to fail” institutions?
41) Who selects the heads of the regulatory agencies?
42) To what extent, if any, does the President’s political appointments to regulatory offices influence the regulatory and regulatory enforcement process?
43) To what extent are the regulatory agencies subject to political ideology?
44) What is the purpose of Senator’s, such as Kerry, Lincoln and Boxer, making statements regarding their understanding of particular provisions of the bill?
45) Are the changes to the Federal Reserve’s emergency authority the “Achilles’ Heel” of Dodd-Frank?
46) What are stress tests? What entities receive stress tests? What are the criteria for stress tests?
47) What is a fiduciary duty? How does Dodd-Frank address potential fiduciary duties of broker-dealers and investment advisors?
48) What deposit insurance reform, if any, does Dodd-Frank make? What were the arguments against the passage of Dodd-Frank?
49) Do you believe that Dodd-Frank should have been enacted? If you were a Senator or Congressman, setting aside party politics, would you have voted for it?
50) Are there any provisions that are of particular concern to you?
51) If you were Cam Fine would you have gone along with Frank?
52) Was as Kaiser asserts, Dodd-Frank an example of Congress working? Why or why not?
53) What responsibility if any does Congress have in overseeing the regulatory and regulatory enforcement process?
54) To what extent, if any, was/is the recovery being held back by regulatory uncertainty?
55) Senator Johnson’s remarks address federal preemption. What is federal preemption and how is it important to federally chartered institutions?
56) Senator Johnson also addresses the standard of care of brokers, dealers and investment advisers. What does he mean by “standard of care?” How, if at all does it differ from a fiduciary duty? How is standard of care implemented in Dodd-Frank?
57) What does Senator Reed indicate that Dodd-Frank does to increase the reliability and validity of credit ratings?
58) What are remittance fees? How did they contribute to the crisis?
59) Did the Congress miss an opportunity to deal with Fannie and Freddie as Senator Kaufman asserts? Will we ever have the political will do deal with Fannie and Freddie?
60) How does Senator Finegold characterize the “‘too big to fail” problem? Do institutions that are too big to fail have a competitive advantage against other smaller institutions?
61) Should auto-dealers have been excluded from CFPB oversight?
62) What were the arguments in favor of the passage of Dodd-Frank?
63) What were the arguments against the passage of Dodd-Frank?
64) Do you believe that Dodd-Frank should have been enacted? If you were a Senator or Congressman, setting aside party politics, would you have voted for it?

Classes 23 and 24 - (April 1 & 8) (No class April 3 - 4 (Spring Weekend) - Dodd-Frank

Class Presentation Due At the Beginning of Class 23 on Wednesday, April 1

Readings:

Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf

Boggs, J.C., Foxman, M. and Nahill, K.
Dodd-Frank At One Year: Growing Pains
Harvard Business Review online

Dodd, C.
Why Dodd-Frank is Necessary
Politico, (2012)
"Failing To End Too Big To Fail": An Assessment of Dodd-Frank Four Years Later

Greenspan, A.
Dodd-Frank Fails to Meet test of our times
Financial Times, (2011)
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/14662fd8-5a28-11e0-86d3-00144feab49a.html#axzz39ufrv7ai

Konczal, M.
Does Dodd-Frank Work? We asked 16 experts to Find out

Konczal, M.
Ignore the Naysayers: Dodd-Frank Reforms Are Finally Paying Off
New Republic, (2014)
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118814/dodd-frank-reforms-are-finally-paying

The Dodd-Frank Act: a cheat sheet
Morrison & Forester, (2010)

The Editors
Ten Reasons to Oppose Dodd Frank
National Review online, (2010)
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/243407/ten-reasons-oppose-dodd-frank-editors

Dodd Frank is over 2,000 pages in length and, four years later, is still not fully implemented. Regulations issued to date total over 14,000 pages. Studying it in depth would encompass a course of several semesters. Davis Polk puts out a monthly progress report on its implementation (http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-Rulemaking-Progress-Report). In its July 2014 report, Davis Polk noted that as of July 1, 2014, a total of 280 Dodd-Frank rulemaking requirement deadlines have passed. Of these 280 passed deadlines, 127 (45.4%) have been missed and 153 (54.6%) have been met with finalized rules. In addition, 208 (52.3%) of the 398 total required rulemakings have been finalized, while 96 (24.1%) of the rulemaking requirements have not yet been proposed.

Given that it is a law that is in existence and that Democrats see no threat of repeal, immediately or otherwise, it is much easier to find articles in opposition of Dodd-Frank than it is to find articles in favor. The reading list is therefore somewhat imbalanced.
Discussion Questions:

1) What are the major provisions of Dodd-Frank?
2) What does the fact that nearly half of the rule-making remains say about the regulatory process and the regulatory agencies?
3) What impact is the delay on the rule-making having on the financial services industry? On the economy as a whole? Who are the members of the Financial Services Oversight Council (FOSC)? What are its functions? Was/is it needed?
4) What is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)? Was/is it needed?
5) What is the orderly liquidation authority?
6) What are the corporate governance provisions within Dodd-Frank?
7) What are the credit rating provisions within Dodd-Frank?
8) What are the changes to the Federal Reserve’s emergency authority? Are those changes the “Achilles’ Heel” of Dodd-Frank?
9) What changes does Dodd-Frank make with respect to SWAPs?
10) What are stress tests? What entities receive stress tests? What are the criteria for stress tests?
11) What are the criteria for being designated as a systematically important financial institution? What are the consequences, if any, of that designation?
12) What deposit insurance reform, if any, does Dodd-Frank make? What impact, if any, does that reform have on systemic risk?
13) Does Dodd-Frank address each of the contributing factors to the Great Recession identified by majority and minority in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report? If so, how?
14) Does Dodd-Frank address each of the contributing factors to the Great Recession that we have identified? If so, how?
15) Should Dodd-Frank have gone further in overhauling the financial regulatory system?
16) How, if at all, does Dodd-Frank impact the competitiveness of U.S. financial institutions in the global marketplace?
17) Was Dodd-Frank necessary?
18) Should Dodd-Frank be repealed?
19) Does Dodd-Frank, as suggested by Alan Greenspan, fail to meet the test of our times?
20) Does Dodd-Frank as asserted by Former Fed Chairman Greenspan, place the burden on the regulators? If so, what does that portend about the future?

Class 25 (April 10) - Presentations Groups 1 - 3

Class 26 (April 15) - Presentations Groups 4 - 6

Class 27 (April 17) - Presentations Groups 7 - 9
Class 28 - (April 22) - **A Global Perspective**

**Readings:**

Bordo, M. D.  
The Globalization of International Financial Markets: What Can History Teach Us?  
Rutgers University and The National Bureau of Economic Research, (March 31, 2000)  
http://econweb.rutgers.edu/bordo/global.pdf

Serven, L and Nguyen, H Global Imbalances Before and After The Global Crisis  
The World Bank, (June 2010)  

Bordo focuses on the globalization of financial markets from an historical perspective of the past one-hundred-and twenty years. Serven and Nguyen survey the academic and policy debate on the role of global imbalances, their role in the inception of the global crisis and their prospects in the aftermath.

**Discussion Questions:**

1) How is the world financial system more global today than in the past? What are the advantages and disadvantages of that?  
2) What kind of governments benefit from increased globalization? What kinds are harmed?  
3) What is meant by the term “global imbalances?”  
4) How might it be asserted that global imbalances led to the Great Recession?  
5) To what extent did global imbalances contribute to the housing bubble in the U.S.?  
6) Why, if at all, should economists care about global imbalances?  
7) How are global imbalances normally corrected? How, it at all, was the Great Recession different?  
8) Do you foresee an increase or decrease in global imbalances in the future? Why or why not?  
9) What countries are funding the U.S. deficit?  
10) What does a large current account deficit indicate about savings?  
11) Why did the Great Recession have a greater impact on emerging countries?  
12) What are the two economic and policy views of global imbalances as described by Seven and Nguyen?  
13) Should Americans care about the U.S. reliance on Chinese capital? Why/why not? Is this more, or less, important during a time of crisis?  
14) In 2009 the British government advised the Caymanian government that “It would be unwise … to expect that the Cayman Islands’ prosperity can presume on an offshore tax haven status.” Does the financial crisis mean the end of tax competition?  
15) Do you foresee an increase or decrease in global imbalances in the future? Why or why not?
Classes 29 (April 24) - Financial Regulation

Readings:

Brunnermeir, M., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C., Persaud, A.D, and Shin, H.
The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation
International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies and The Centre For Economic Policy Research, (2009)

Butler, W.
Lessons from the global financial crisis for regulators and supervisors
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/DP635.pdf

Sherman, M.
A Short History of Financial Deregulation in the United States
Center for Policy and Research, (June, 2009)

Turner, Lord A.
Chairman, United Kingdom Financial Services Authority
The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation
The Economist's Inaugural City Lecture, (February 4, 2009)

The Squam Lake Report Fixing the Financial System

Sherman provides a summary of the major regulatory changes over the past three decades. Lord Turner, the chair of the UK’s financial regulatory agency, in a controversial speech in 2009, argued that financial crisis revealed that Britain’s financial industry is too large and needs to be downsized. Brunnermeir, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin provide key recommendations on macro-prudential measures, as well as other minor issues such as the role of stress tests (focus on the conclusions and recommendations (pp. 63 - 66). The Squam Lake Report, crafted by a group of 15 leading economists, provides specific policy recommendation on specific issues that might have mitigated the financial crisis (focus on Chapter 1, the introduction (pp. 5 - 17) and Chapter 11, the conclusion (pp. 79 - 87).
Discussion Questions:

1) What regulatory changes instituted over the last 3-decades contributed to or exacerbated the crisis?
2) Is the financial industry too large? If so, should it be downsized as suggested by Lord Turner?
3) Be prepared to discuss each of the general conclusions and recommendations of Brunnermeir, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin. Do you agree? Are the recommendations politically feasible? Why or why not?
4) Do you agree with the principles set forth in the Squam Lake Report?
5) Would the financial crisis have occurred if the recommendations in the Squam Lake Report had been in place?
6) How does one distinguish between the health of an individual financial institution and the stability of the entire financial system?
7) What regulatory changes instituted over the last 3-decades contributed to or exacerbated the crisis?
8) What changes in financial system oversight does Lord Turner recommend?